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ABSTRACT
Agent-based models (ABM) are becoming increasingly used for social simulation experiments. Various
aspects of social interaction are modeled with ABM in various ways. When considering collective dynamics
in social systems a modeler may need to shift focus between evolutionary, socio-topographical, or cognitive
issues of a system. I present three original papers demonstrating complex behavior arising from collective
dynamics in ABM simulations focusing on evolutionary and cognitive mechanisms.
The ﬁrst report demonstrates the coupled emergence of cooperation and selﬁsh punishment behavior in
groups of individuals playing an iterated public goods game. ABM is implemented here to describe an
evolutionary system and test game theory hypotheses about one possible avenue for the evolution of altruism.
The focus lies on a search for evolutionarily stable strategies within a global population over time. Single
agents are determined by phenotypic propensities towards altruism and punishing. An emergence of the
correlation between punishing and cheating is paired with the emergence of a high rate of altruism. Selﬁsh
punishment in this case can be seen as a second level form of altruism, as altruistic punishment is typically
seen. The model presented does not account for cognitive mechanisms, but demonstrates an evolutionary
explanation for collective dynamics of altruism in game theory terms.
The second report demonstrates the effects of mental modeling within groups of decision makers. In this
report we shift our focus from evolutionary mechanisms to cognitive mechanisms, particularly the effects
of remembering information received from others in conversation and the resulting change in one’s own
world view due to adjusting for the information received from others. In this case we are investigating how
differences in interactions between agents will lead to differences in group problem solving performances.
We seek the effects of varying the memory parameter and ﬁnd a sharp threshold, passing which leads to
similar individual perceptions of problem space and consequently suboptimal exploration of all possibilities
in problem space. This model demonstrates no evolutionary mechanisms, as it asks questions only pertaining
to cognitive mechanisms of the agents.
The third report demonstrates a synthesis of evolutionary and cognitive mechanisms. Simulated discus-
sants in a team approaching a problem act as an evolutionary environment for the evolution of ideas. Cogni-
tive mechanisms are translated into evolutionary operators. Individuals perform evolutionary operators on a
population of ideas at the disposal all participants in the team. Investigated are the evolutionary behaviors of
various groups with various compositions of propensities towards certain evolutionary operators. We ﬁnd that
certain combinations of operators are drastically more effective than others at discovering optimal solutions
and that proper balance between selective and creative operators is important for ﬁnding good solutions.
These studies are but three of many ways to implement ABM for social modeling. In the last section I
discuss further possibilities for synthesizing multiple social mechanisms within ABM simulations of social
systems. In some cases it is best to simply choose one approach from another, but as simulations are increas-
ingly called upon to model more complex scenarios in which many disparate mechanisms are simultaneously
paramount, reconciling separate dynamics that span more than one theoretical basis is becoming a crucial
skill for creating meaningful models.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Basic Description of ABM
Agent based models include any model demanding the abstraction of an agent. An agent is a set of
information that performs actions based on a set of rules and may change it’s own set of information based on
the events it participates in. All of these things fall under the umbrella of ABM: A checker game; a genetic
algorithm; virtually any video game; and countless models of real systems such as economic models in which
agents represent single actors participating in an economic system. Since ABM uses one-to-one analogues
of the system modeled, they are intuitive and technically simple. Since ABM often demonstrates complex
phenomena through repetitive computer simulations it is often conceptually difﬁcult to predict outcomes.
ABM is often used to explore iterated interactions between agents that, despite being well-deﬁned would be
intractable for analytical methods, especially in game theory and evolutionary theory scenarios [4, 15, 2, 43].
ABM is useful when modeling systems with complex agents or where interactions between agents are
complex. It often proves the best approach when interactions are discontinuous, nonlinear, or carry historicity.
Similarly, when spacial relations are important, keeping track of moving parts is easiest in an ABM construct.
It is useful for systems consisting of heterogeneous or hierarchically ordered populations of agents. It is useful
for modeling systems with nontrivial or dynamical topologies such as network based systems. In short, ABM
is basically useful for making models that fail to be captured by traditional equation-based models.
Since ABM is such a new and broad ﬁeld, there are areas of controversy such as the need for universal
methodologies [42, 24, 37] and validation methods [21]. At the same time there seems to be much consensus
that ABM is the best simulation technique for accurately describing social phenomena [14, 15, 21], and is
expected to become the default platform for social computational models [12]. There are multiple avenues
for implementing models from various levels of baseline complexity. Besides programming from scratch,
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there exist libraries and frameworks such as Swarm and Repast, visual ABM coding environments such as
NetLogo and StarLogo, and scripting programming environments such as Mathematica and Matlab.
While much work is needed on developing universal methodologies and techniques allowing for com-
parisons across models, ABM has undeniably demonstrated great progress in producing explanatory models.
ABM is often cited in or the basis for exciting, new dynamical systems and complex systems theory explana-
tions for anomalous things such as complex features [31], altruism [20, 13], culture [38, 1], language [3, 25]
and higher-level intelligence [9].
Sociality, Evolution, and ABM
The presence of sociality in an evolutionary system changes how selection pressures relate to an indi-
vidual’s behavior. In social systems individuals affect others in ways besides direct competition; the ﬁtness
of all individuals within a social group are tied together because they all share some conditions deﬁned by
the boundaries of the social group [44]. Evolutionary game theory has been useful for illustrating models of
social strategies in evolutionary systems and often times the best format for models is ABM when dealing
with complex systems. Since evolutionary theory is algorithmic in nature (Darwin, after-all, was able to de-
scribe biological evolution without access to the micro-level mechanisms), evolutionary systems often loan
themselves well to computational simulation [36].
The dove-hawk game, for example, demonstrates a contest of two strategies vying for a resource [34].
Doves share and do not ﬁght, while hawks ﬁght and do not share. Hawks, when meeting a dove take all of
a resource, and when meeting another hawk take half of a resource on average while also paying a cost of
ﬁghting. Doves meeting doves simply split the resource evenly. In a well mixed population the evolutionary
dynamics can be described analytically using frequency dependent ﬁtness equations. A single equilibrium
point of a certain distribution of populations can be analytically found. If the cost of ﬁghting is high, then the
hawk is a self limiting strategy due to the high negative effect of homogeneous interactions.
As spatial interactions come into play, the mathematics become more complicated and in some cases
untenable. When agents are placed in groups that are competing on the group-level, for example, it may
become necessary to turn to ABM to examine the effects of both local relative ﬁtness of individuals within
groups and the global ﬁtness of groups between groups. Often times multiple evolutionary stable strategies
(ESS) can be demonstrated in such cases.
ABM has been especially useful for social simulation because it best portrays social systems made of
agents and interactions of complex qualities. I will brieﬂy describe in what way it was adapted for each
speciﬁc system investigated in the three studies presented. It will be demonstrated in what way ABM was
used to model the following systems: (1) The evolution of a self limiting strategy; (2) Emergence of shared
2
mental models of problem spaces; (3) The evolution of an ecology of ideas.
1.1 Evolution of a self limiting strategy
In Chapter 2 we study the emergence of an ESS that is self limiting (selﬁsh punishers) and dependent upon
the existence of non-punishing altruists. Selﬁshness as a trait alone is typically viewed as negative behavior
regarding group ﬁtness. Studies concerned with the evolution of sociality and altruism usually investigate
mechanisms that limit selﬁshness such as models focusing on punishment mechanisms [45, 46, 22, 19, 18, 7,
17, 23, 16]. Punishment, however, is often costly and therefore second-order altruism [45, 5, 6, 16]. We study
a polymorphous strategy within which an individual behaves selﬁshly in ﬁrst order interactions, but behaves
altruistically in second order interactions by punishing other cheaters.
We created an Agent Based Model in the programming language of Mathematica. In our simulation a
large population of individuals is divided into ephemeral groups of size N . Groups play a public goods
game. There are two rounds of activity. First, individuals have an opportunity to contribute a portion of
their endowment to a central fund that is doubled and evenly redistributed to all group members. Second,
Individuals have an opportunity to contribute part of their endowment to a central fund that increases the
chance of ejecting cheaters from the group. All individuals have inherited propensities to cooperate and to
punish. Each trait is modeled as a number between 0 and 1 in increments of 0.1. We ﬁnd that a negative
correlation between altruism and punishment emerges, representing groups of non-punishing altruists with
selﬁsh punishers.
1.2 Emergence of shared mental models of problem spaces
Problem solving is becoming more and more a collective activity in which neither groups nor problems are
divisible into separable subsystems [26]. Techniques for demonstrating group level behaviors are emerging
from several disciplines [1, 33, 30, 29]. New analysis techniques are being developed in the psychology and
organizational behavior literature [11, 47, 26] that focus on multiple levels of interaction between individu-
als. Evolutionary biology, likewise, is turning to multilevel selection theory [44, 40, 35] for explanations of
anomalous behaviors such as altruism and sociality.
The theory of social situatedness [32, 39] recognizes that an individual requires a social and cultural
environment to develop intelligence to have an arena within which to apply intelligence. Socially situated
intelligence is becoming well represented, notably in AI and ALife literature [8, 28, 10, 41, 25]. These models
often make use of Theory of Mind (ToM), where ToM is one agent’s ability to perceive the thoughts of the
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other to some degree.
In Chapter 3 we investigate the effects of ToM on groups of agents in non-competitive settings, as opposed
to the typical evolutionary system in which an agent can get an edge on another by predicting the other’s
actions. We study the dynamics of collective decision making with regards to various interaction protocols
and various possibilities for mental model formation.
We created an ABM construct that simulated groups of individuals negotiating multidimensional opti-
mization problems. Individuals each have imperfect information and are limited to local information retrieval.
Through conversation individuals share information with each other and come to consensus on best solutions.
As agents share information, however, focus closes in on the region of discussion leaving large regions in the
problem space unexplored.
1.3 Evolution of an ecology of ideas
Similarly to the previous chapter, we address collective decision making again in Chapter 4. In this case,
however, we focus on modeling both evolutionary dynamics and cognitive mechanisms of individuals in
groups. Leadership, psychology and organizational behavior disciplines have studied collective dynamics of
groups in decision processes, but they often fail to account for nonlinear processes, high-dimensional problem
spaces and non-trivial social structure [26]. ABM is a well suited format for modeling such circumstances.
Dynamical modeling studies have considered complex problem spaces [27], but not in addition to complex
social interactions.
In Chapter 4 we model team decision making dynamics by simulating an evolving ecology of ideas in an
environment described by the conversational propensities of team members. Several cognitive mechanisms
are mapped to evolutionary mechanisms and are in this way applied to a progressive process of decision
making. We use an ABM format in order to capture the complexity of individuals and their interactions.
We demonstrate various evolutionary dynamics captured by various mixtures of propensities towards certain
selective and creative actions.
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Abstract
Altruistic punishment refers to a class of behaviors that deters cheating at a cost to the punisher, making it
a form of second-order altruism. Usually, it is assumed that the punishers are themselves solid citizens who
refrain from cheating. We show in a simulation model that altruism and punishment paradoxically become
negatively correlated, leading to a form of selﬁsh punishment. Examples of selﬁsh punishment can be found
in organisms as diverse as wasps, birds, and humans.
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2.1 Introduction
Altruism is famously difﬁcult to evolve because of potential exploitation by cheaters. Punishment can po-
tentially deter cheating, but it often requires time, energy and risk. The term altruistic punishment refers to
a class of behaviors that deters cheating at the expense of the punisher, qualifying as a form of second-order
altruism in comparison to ﬁrst-order altruists who do not punish [15, 13, 11, 4, 10, 16, 9]. The cost of pun-
ishing cheaters, along with the cost of being cheated, make it difﬁcult to explain altruistic punishment as an
evolutionary stable strategy [2, 3, 9]. This report suggests another way that altruism can be maintained; by
cheaters who punish other cheaters.
The concept of selﬁsh punishment was suggested to us by an empirical study on humans showing that
individuals most likely to punish cheaters were also most tempted to cheat [7]. This seems hypocritical in
moral terms but makes sense as a behavioral strategy because cheaters decrease the ﬁtness of everyone in
their groups, including other cheaters. A negative correlation between punishment and altruism might exist
if cheaters have an even greater incentive than altruists to get rid of other cheaters. A few theoretical models
have addressed this possibility [20, 24], but it needs to be explored more fully, especially in the context of the
public goods games used by experimental economists to study the dynamics of cooperation in human social
groups [12, 13, 16].
Our model suggests that when the propensity to cooperate and the propensity to punish are modelled as
independent traits, a negative correlation between altruism and punishment robustly evolves, although the size
of the correlation varies with parameters such as group size, duration of the group, and the cost of punishing
others.
2.2 Methods
The program was implemented in Mathematica and is available from the authors upon request. We com-
posed an N-person evolutionary game theory model that emulates one of the standard public goods games in
experimental economics [12]. The model begins with an inﬁnite population of individuals that vary in their
propensity for altruism (A) and punishment (P ). These traits are modelled as two variables that initially
vary uniformly and independently between 0 and 1 at 0.1 increments. A large number (T ) of groups of size
N are formed at random. Members of each group play multiple rounds (R) of a two-phase public goods
game. During phase 1, each individual is given an endowment (E) and allowed to contribute a proportion
to a central fund, which is doubled and distributed equally to all members of the group. The remainder is
retained by the individual at its initial value. Each individuals (i) altruism trait determines the proportion
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of its endowment that it contributes (Ai) and withholds (1 − Ai). Individual payoffs at the end of phase 1
can be represented by Eq. (1), where the proﬁts earned for a given individual (payi) is calculated by adding
the individuals share of the public fund 2E(
∑N
j=1 Aj)/N to the portion of the endowment the individual
selﬁshly withheld from group donation E(1−Ai). Individuals maximize their own payoff by withholding all
of their endowment (A = 0), but this strategy minimizes the payoff for the group, resulting in the classical
prisoners dilemma situation:
payi = E(1−Ai) +
2E(
∑N
j=1 Aj)
N
(2.1)
During phase 2, individuals are allowed to contribute resources to detect and punish those who were
stingy during phase 1 (the cheaters). Each individual is assumed to know the total contribution of other group
members but not the contribution of each individual. Investing in punishment results in a probability that
the least altruistic member of the group (other than oneself) will be detected and excluded from subsequent
rounds of the game, to be replaced by another individual drawn randomly from the same population as the
original members. This is biologically reasonable if we assume that not everyone can get into groups and that
the remainder forms a waiting list for replacements. The fact that the replacements play fewer rounds than
the original members is immaterial because they still contribute to ﬁtness differentials in the total population,
based on how they play the game during the remaining rounds.
The amount that an individual invests in punishment is based on three factors, as shown in Eq. (2). The
ﬁrst term (Pi) represents the individuals static punishment trait. The second term (
∑n−1
j=1,j =1 1−Aj)/(N−1)
represents the average amount of cheating that took place among other members of the group. The third term
(C) represents the amount required to detect the worst cheater with certainty:
punCi = Pi
∑n−1
j=1,j =1 1−Aj)
(N − 1) C (2.2)
Amaximum of two individuals can be removed during any particular round of the game; the worst cheater,
based on the efforts of the other group members, or the next worst cheater, based on the efforts of the worst
cheater. The probability that the worst cheater will not be detected by a given member of the group i is
esci = 1− Pi
∑n−1
j=1,j =1 1−Aj)
(N − 1) (2.3)
The probability that the worst cheater will be detected and removed by any member of the group is
remall = (1−
n−1∏
i=1
esci)D (2.4)
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where the worst cheater is not included in the calculation. The term D gives the probability that the
cheater can be removed, once detected. When D = 1, the probability of detection is equal to the probability
of removal. When D = 0 then removal is impossible, regardless of detection. The probability that the
next worst cheater is removed is similar to Eq. (4), with only the worst cheater included in the calculation.
The idea of the worst cheater removing the second worst cheater makes sense for two reasons. First, by
removing the second worst cheater, the worst cheater reduces the amount of cheating perceived by the group,
effectively weakening the strength of punishment (decreasing the middle term in Eq. (2)). Second, despite the
punishment efforts of the group there remains uncertainty that the worst cheater will be banished. Therefore,
by removing the next worst cheater, the worst cheater increases its likelihood of remaining in later rounds.
The other (N − 2) members are safe during a particular round of the game but can become vulnerable if
replacements make them one of the worst two cheaters in subsequent rounds. After the game is played for
a number of rounds (R) within each group and for a large number (T ) of randomly formed groups, each
individual is assigned a ﬁtness based on its total earnings and a baseline ﬁtness value (B), representing the
fact that ﬁtness is not determined entirely by the interactions that take place during the game. Fitness is then
summed for each strategy-type accounting for both abundance and ﬁtness, deriving a cumulative ﬁtness value
for each combination of altruism and punishment (121 types). These cumulative sums are then normalized to
sum 1, representing the frequency of each strategy type following asexual reproduction in direct proportion
to ﬁtness, which become the new frequencies of the 121 types in the inﬁnite population for the next round of
group formation. It should be noted that asexual reproduction is interpreted loosely in terms of the replicator
dynamic of evolutionary game theory, which includes any process that causes the most successful strategies
to increase in frequency in the population [14].
Table 2.1: List of model parameters and default values
Variable Baseline value Deﬁnition
A (0-1) at 0.1 increments Proportion of endowment
allocated to the group fund
C 40 Maximum cost of punishment
D 0.5 Efﬁciency of removal of a cheater
upon detection
E 50 Resources allocated to each player
at the beginning of each round of play
M 10−4 Mutation rate
N 4 Group size
P (0-1) at 0.1 increments Propensity to punish
R 6 Number of rounds played per generation
T 104 Number of groups per simulation
Mutations in the altruism and punishment traits were assumed to occur with a frequency of (M) and took
place during the asexual reproduction stage. In one set of simulations, a type was assumed to mutate into any
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other type with equal probability, resulting in all types potentially being present in the population at a low
frequency. In another set of simulations, mutations were assumed to deviate by a value of ±1, which means
that a given type could be completely absent from the population.
Simulations were run with 2 alternate scenarios of initial population frequencies. The ﬁrst began with
all combinations of the altruism (A) and punishment (P ) traits in equal proportions. The second began with
the population ﬁxed for A = 0 and P = 0 to see if altruism and punishment could evolve from mutation
frequencies.
To summarize (1) Groups are most productive when everyone invests their entire endowment, (2) in the
absence of punishment, individuals are most productive within each group when they withhold their own
investment; (3) punishment can cause cheating to become disadvantageous; (4) punishment is costly for the
punisher; and (5) the altruism and punishment traits are initially uncorrelated. Our prediction is that a negative
correlation (cheaters more likely to punish) will develop on the basis of the model dynamics. The parameters
and their default values are listed in Table 1.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Initial conditions
A representative simulation run with the initial population consisting of an even distribution of all possible
combinations of altruism and punishment is shown in Fig. 1 (see legend for parameter values). The most
stingy individuals are quickly removed from the population by punishment (generation 20), followed by the
elimination of most punishers due to the cost of punishment (generation 50). Variation in both the altruism
and punishment trait is maintained at equilibrium, with a negative correlation between the two traits represent-
ing a stable equilibrium of altruistic non-punishers and selﬁsh punishers, as we predicted (generation 100).
Fig. 2 shows that the equilibrium is maintained over the long term, although coupled oscillations between
the frequencies of the two traits and their covariance take place over shorter time scales. Unlike altruistic
punishers, selﬁsh punishers possess the ability to recoup the cost of punishment through their exploitation of
altruists within groups.
Fig. 3 shows a comparable run in which the initial population consists entirely of selﬁsh non-punishers
(A = 0, P = 0). Remarkably, the same equilibrium is established, although a large number of generations is
required. If the capacity for punishment is eliminated by setting D to zero, altruism does not evolve from this
starting point. To see how selﬁsh punishment promotes the evolution of altruism, consider a single selﬁsh
punisher in a given group. By expelling the most selﬁsh individuals, which are replaced by randomly chosen
Figure 2.1: Selected generations of a simulation run started from an initial population composed of even
population distribution of all strategies. Topography ﬁgures illustrate the phenotypic distribution of the pop-
ulation, demonstrating the reduction of cheaters (generation 20), then the reduction of altruistic punishers
(generation 50), and a negative correlation between altruism and punishment at equilibrium (generation 100).
This run consisted of 1000 groups of N = 4 individuals created at random from the total population every
generation. Within each group, the game was played for R = 6 rounds. The maximum cost of detecting
and excluding a cheater was C = 80 % of ones endowment and the efﬁciency of removal of a cheater upon
detection was D = 0.5.
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Figure 2.2: Time-series graph of a selected simulation showing the average trait values of the population for
altruism and punishment over 1000 generations along with the emerging negative correlation between the
two traits. Parameter values are the same as Fig. 1.
members of the total population, the punisher increases the average degree of altruism within the group.
Altruists now beneﬁt from each other and the selﬁsh punisher recovers the cost of punishment by exploiting
the altruists during subsequent rounds. Of course, this will only work if there is a sufﬁcient frequency of
altruists in the total population. Although the simulation run begins withA = 0, a mutation rate ofM = 10−4
results in a selectionmutation balance of approximately 7 % of the population with A > 0, which is sufﬁcient
for the concentrating effect of punishment to take place. A large number of generations is required for the
selectionmutation balance to establish itself, accounting for the time required for altruism to evolve in Fig. 3.
An implication is that altruism will not evolve from a starting point of A = 0 when the mutation rate (M) is
sufﬁciently low or the cost of punishing (C) is sufﬁciently high, which we will demonstrate below.
Now that we have described the dynamics of the model during a single simulation run, we will vary single
parameters of the model while keeping the others at their default values (shown in Table 1 and Fig. 1).
2.3.2 Cost of punishment
The cost of punishing others is modelled by the parameter C, which represents the proportion of the endow-
ment that is required to detect a cheater with certainty. Fig. 4 shows that the equilibrium levels and altruism
and punishment decline as C is increased, although they remain at moderate levels even at the highest value
of C. The lower part of Fig. 4 shows that the correlation between the altruism and punishment is close to zero
when punishing others is nearly cost-free, but becomes increasingly negative when punishing others becomes
costly. Thus, our model suggests that the concept of selﬁsh punishment is especially relevant when punishing
others is costly.
2.3.3 Group size
The equilibrium levels of altruism and punishment also decline with group size (Fig. 5), although remaining
at moderate levels even at the highest value tested. The negative correlation between altruism and punishment
reaches its lowest value at a value of N = 7 and then rises slightly. These trends reﬂect a number of factors.
When N = 2, the concept of a public good is not applicable because an individual must punish if there is
to be any punishment of its single partner. At high values of N , the capacity to punish is limited by round
length. Only a maximum of two cheaters can be removed during each round, which means that when group
size exceeds round length, intermediate cheaters are immune to punishment.
2.3.4 Round length
When groups exist for only a single round of play, punishment cannot maintain altruism and both traits go
to zero, except for mutations, as shown in Fig. 6. The positive correlation between the two traits when
R = 1 is based on the fact that most individuals have values of zero for both traits while a few (the mutants)
have positive values of both traits. Punishment becomes increasingly effective at maintaining cooperation
as round length increases. At the highest value of R tested, an average value of approximately 0.4 for the
punishment trait maintains altruism at close to its maximum value. Round length has an indirect effect on the
cost of being punished and the beneﬁts of excluding cheaters from ones group. When cheaters are excluded
from their group, they keep their earnings but sit out the remaining rounds of the game. This cost becomes
increasingly severe as R increases, especially relative to those who remain in the game. Thus, increasing R is
similar to decreasing the cost of punishing cheaters, causing the correlation between altruism and punishment
to decrease, as in Fig. 4.
2.3.5 Mutations
For simulations that began with an equal distribution of all types, model results were not affected by the two
assumptions about mutations within the range of M = 10−2 - 10−7. For models that began with A = 0,
P = 0, a sufﬁciently small mutation rate (given either assumption) can prevent the frequency of altruists at
mutationselection balance from achieving the threshold required for the concentrating effect of punishment
to take place. Similarly, when the cost of punishment is increased (C), a corresponding increase in mutation
rate is required for altruism to evolve from a mutation frequency.
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2.4 Discussion
Punishing others requires time, energy, and risk, just like any other trait. In dyadic interactions, the costs and
beneﬁts of punishing a cheater can be calculated in a straightforward fashion because the punisher is the sole
beneﬁciary of the punishment [5]. In larger groups, the beneﬁts of punishment are shared by other members
of the group who do not share the costs, creating a public goods problem that increases with the cost of
punishing others. The proverbs It takes a thief to catch a thief and there is no honor amongst thieves imply that
no one is better at ﬁnding a cheater than another cheater and that cheaters themselves interact competitively.
Cheaters might have a number of special advantages for detecting and excluding other cheaters, such as
familiarity with cheating strategies or experience at ﬁghting. These special advantages are not included in
our model. Instead, we made the conservative assumption that altruism and punishment are separate and
(initially) uncorrelated traits. An extreme altruist is just as capable of detecting and excluding cheaters as
an extreme cheater. Nevertheless, a negative correlation between the altruism and punishment traits robustly
develops based on the model dynamics.
One way to interpret selﬁsh punishment is as an entirely selﬁsh strategy whereby cheaters maintain and
protect ﬂocks of cooperators for their own advantage, similar to the way that the maﬁa offers protection for a
price. Alternatively, selﬁsh punishment can be regarded as a division of altruistic labor, with some individuals
providing the ﬁrst-order public good of cooperation and others providing the second-order public good of
punishment, similar to the way that human communities support a police force. Division of labor evolves
because altruistic punishers suffer a double cost whereas selﬁsh punishers in the same group are compensated
for the cost of punishment by being exempted from cooperation during the ﬁrst round. Regardless of how it
is interpreted, selﬁsh punishment can cause altruism to evolve and be maintained at a high frequency without
the problems usually associated with altruistic punishment. There is a threshold frequency of altruism that
must be crossed before altruism can be positively selected, but it is sufﬁciently low that mutationselection
balance is sufﬁcient, at least for certain combinations of M and C. See Wilson and Dugatkin (1997) for
a discussion of the problem of origination for the evolution of altruism in models that assume quantitative
variation vs. discrete traits.
The correlation between selﬁshness and punishment becomes increasingly strong as the cost of punishing
others (C) increases. Examples of low-cost punishment in human social interactions include gossip and col-
lective decisions that cannot be opposed because the group is so much stronger than any particular individual
(see Sober and Wilson, 1998, Chapter 5 for ethnographic examples from a random sample of cultures). In
these cases, punishment and altruism should remain uncorrelated. The effects of group size and round length
can also be interpreted in terms of public beneﬁts and private costs. Increasing group size makes punishment
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ineffective because at most only one cheater can be removed during each round of the game. Increasing round
length enables more cheaters to be excluded and increases the differential between those who are excluded
and those who remain.
Nakamaru and Iwasa (2006) model of selﬁsh punishment considers four discrete strategies; altruistic
punisher (AP), altruistic non-punisher (AN), selﬁsh punisher (SP) and selﬁsh non-punisher (SN). The inter-
actions are dyadic and punishment causes ones selﬁsh partner to pay a ﬁne at an expense to the punisher.
Individuals exist on a two-dimensional lattice and interact either with their four nearest neighbors (lattice
model) or with four individuals chosen at random from the total population (completely mixing population).
In both cases, individuals compete with their four nearest neighbors based on their payoffs, either in terms of
survival (score-dependent viability model) or reproduction (score-dependent fertility model). The SP strat-
egy can invade and persist in some of these conditions but not others. As in our model, it can facilitate the
evolution of altruistic strategies by virtue of its negative effect on other punishers.
Our model allows gradations of altruism and punishment, assumes interactions in randomly formed
groups of size N rather than dyadic interactions on a lattice, and is intended to emulate the public goods
games that experimental economists use to study altruism and punishment in human social interactions.
Given these assumptions, we observe a robust negative correlation between altruism and punishment, al-
though the magnitude of the correlation varies with the parameter values. Obviously, these two models only
begin to explore the different kinds of social settings and population structures in which selﬁsh punishment
might exist as a successful behavioral strategy [21, 23, 24].
Considerable evidence for altruism maintained by competition among selﬁsh individuals exists for nonhu-
man species, from insects to vertebrates. Wenseleers et al. describe a corrupt policing strategy in tree wasps
Dolichovespula sylvestris, where workers that police other workers lay their own eggs [25]. Scrub jays that
tend to steal caches from other scrub jays are also more defensive of their own caches [8]. In addition to our
empirical study on humans that inspired our simulation model [7], the history of medieval knights provides
a potential historical example of selﬁsh punishment. Much as the knights of old are revered in mythology
and popular culture, the ﬁrst Castellans are better described as selﬁsh thugs who fought among themselves
to exploit the defenseless, and therefore altruistic, peasants [1]. As Pope Gregory VII put it during the 11th
century (quoted in Bisson, 1994, p. 42), Who does not know that kings and princes derive their origin from
men ignorant of God who raised themselves above their fellows by pride, plunder, treachery, and murder?
In this human example and many non-human examples, the dynamics of altruism and punishment are
complicated by power asymmetries such as social dominance [5, 6, 17, 18, 19, 22]. Our model shows that
selﬁshness and punishment can become correlated even in the absence of power asymmetries and other factors
that give cheaters an intrinsic advantage in punishing other cheaters.
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Figure 2.3: Selected generations of a simulation run started from an initial population composed of only the
selﬁsh non-punishing strategy. Topography ﬁgures illustrate the phenotypic distribution of the population,
starting from the initial selﬁsh non-punisher distribution (generation 1), then the increase of altruism in the
population (generation 200), and the further increase of altruism (generation 300) until reaching a stable
equilibrium depicted in Fig. 1. This run consisted of 1000 groups of N = 4 individuals created at random
from the total population every generation. Within each group, the game was played for R = 6 rounds. The
maximum cost of detecting and excluding a cheater was C = 80% of ones endowment and the efﬁciency of
removal of a cheater upon detection was D = 0.5.
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Figure 2.4: The average correlation between altruism and punishment as the cost of detecting and excluding
cheaters (C) increases. Error bars indicate the range of ﬁve replicate simulations for each set of parameter
values. A low cost indicates that the maximum probability of detecting and removing a cheater can be
achieved with a low proportion of ones endowment. Within this range, the amount that an individual invests
is based on the value of its punishment trait and the amount of cheating that took place during phase 1 of the
game. Other parameter values are the same as Figs. 1 and 2.
Figure 2.5: Levels of altruism and punishment decline however remain at moderate levels when increasing
group size (N). The correlation between altruism and punishment declines with group size until its maximum
value at group size N = 7 then begins to raises slightly. Error bars indicate the range of ﬁve replicate
simulations for each set of parameter (N) values. Other parameters values are the same as Figs. 1 and 2.
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Figure 2.6: Levels of Altruism and punishment increase with increasing the number of rounds (R) of group
play per generation. Altruism and punishment levels at parameter value R = 1 indicate that both cooperation
and punishment are unsuccessful in one-shot games. These values increase in simulations of successively
longer iterated games. The correlation between altruism and punishment approaches zero with increasing
rounds of group play indicating less overall punishment (see text for explanation indirect effect of round
length on punishment costs). Error bars indicate the range of ﬁve replicate simulations for each set of param-
eter (R) values. Other parameters values are the same as Figs. 1 and 2.
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Abstract
To identify limitations to group level intelligence and propose possible solutions, we investigate dynamics
of group decision making processes on complex problems when individuals are capable of forming men-
tal models of others based on the history of the group discussion. Our results suggest a counter-intuitive
possibility that as the capacity of memory increases, the amount of information sharing may decrease far
below the entire problem space. This is due to premature convergence of group discussion on a particular
solution; incorporating knowledge from others into one’s own world view creates a local agreement, leaving
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unexplored diversities beyond the scope of discussion. The mechanisms stiﬂing group level exploration and
possible protocols for overstepping local optima are discussed.
3.1 Introduction
Problem solving in the 21st century increasingly draws on indivisible group efforts to address issues that
are neither individual sized nor reducible to separable subsystems [8]. Collaborations no longer express
additivity. Forming appropriate interaction architectures and protocols for groups has become a problem
rivaling the original goals around which groups are formed. Mainstream, traditional science has tended to
either focus on individuals as unique and separate, or on populations as probabilistic, leaving a large range of
group behaviors neglected, much like newtonian mechanics and statistical mechanics fail to capture physical
systems displaying organized complexity [23]. The appropriate response to both epistemological dilemmas
has been to reevaluate the extents to which ordinary analytical methods and assumptions have been effective
and develop new methodologies capable of addressing the unexplored range of behaviors.
A wave of innovative techniques for analyzing and demonstrating group level behavior is ﬂooding the lit-
erature from several disciplines. Artiﬁcial societies science is a vanguard pioneer of group level intelligence,
mapping out imaginative, theoretical [1, 14]; realistic, applied [12]; and paradigm widening, possibilistic
[11] angles. Other areas such as organizational behavior [6, 26] and psychology [8] are showing renewed in-
terest in multilevel analysis of group behavior; while some disciplines such as evolutionary biology [24, 20]
and evolutionary psychology [16] have made regular use of mulitilevel selection theory as an explanatory
implement for seemingly anomalous behavior such as altruism and sociobioloigal complexity.
Since the current extent of research grows rapidly and it is difﬁcult to track and maintain historical and in-
terdisciplinary coherence, it is instructive while developing methodologies to pay mind to the current cultural
backdrop in which research is conducted. Common mistakes and overlooked opportunities reveal themselves
readily and imminent issues to be addressed stand out more clearly.
Most techniques used to study intelligence share common limits due to underlying assumptions. It has
been generally assumed that individuals can be addressed as separate pieces, each measured by some uni-
versal metric. It is worth noting that many popular general intelligence measures unequivocally have and
continue to serve segregating and hegemonistic purposes [15]. In couching the framework of some group
problem solving circumstance, in which the assumption of separability of actors is false, i.e. there is some
amount of inherent socio-complexity, approaches treating individuals as interchangeable are neither useful
nor feasible.
An alternative perspective considers the very idea of intelligence as rooted in collective phenomena. The
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concept has been developed in theories of social situatedness [13, 19] recognizing that an individual requires a
social and cultural embedding to develop and display intelligence, and evolutionary social intelligence theory
[3] that credits an environment of evolutionary adaptedness with inter-individual interaction as not only a
necessary entailment of social interactions themselves, but the prime cause and basis of complex intelligence
in humans.
Since the ﬁeld of artiﬁcial societies is relatively new itself [17] there remains a scarcity of models repre-
senting sociality as a generative and central component of intelligent systems rather than an epiphenomenon
[18] or teleological basis [5]. And, although the idea of socially situated intelligence is hardly novel [22], it
is just recently claiming much interest in the sciences of the artiﬁcial, notably in AI and ALife communities
both explicitly [2, 10, 4] and implicitly in models that explore collective behavior in groups of agents capable
of Theory of Mind (ToM) [21, 7], where ToM may be deﬁned as the ability to perceive another’s intention to
some extent.
ToM is typically associated with competitive settings. While the work cited above concerns coordinated
behavior, evolutionary selection algorithms still pit agents against each other in a competition to reproduce
and prolong existence into successive generations. In this context, ToM and joint attention are not directly
applied to form a collaborative understanding of some mutual information, but rather to incite a group behav-
ior that depends on a recursion of competitive feedback, which beneﬁts all agents involved in a successful
event.
Here we explore the relatively neglected area of entirely non-competitive constructs. Speciﬁcally, we
address the problem of describing dynamical group decision making processes with respect to differing sets
of interaction protocols. We present a model that simulates agents attempting to navigate multi-dimensional,
continuous problem spaces9 with incomplete information of the world and each-other, and localized infor-
mation retrieval from their own memories. As such, the formation of group cohesion does not develop from
coincidental similarities, but arises from dynamic interactions of a heterogeneous mixture of actors, where
commonalities of perception evolve out of redundancies in interactions.
Our results suggest a limitation to a group’s exploration of a problem space as a consequence of record-
ing previous discussion and mental model formation of others. Discussion becomes repetitive, addressing
a limited scope of the problem space, within which individual models display within group homogeneity.
Exploring hidden information in the regions beyond the scope of discussion becomes a nontrivial problem
for groups demonstrating mental model formation. Some solutions in the past have been to separate agents
in order that they not bias each other. For complex problem solving such methods are not plausible due to a
non-decomposability of tasks. We suggest possible protocols of interaction for enhancing the problem space
exploration while maintaining group structure and cohesion.
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Figure 3.1: A schematic illustration of the model. A group consisting of n agents is lead in discussion by a
speaker, while the role of which alternates cyclically at each round. There exists some true utility function
(upper right inset) for which the group is tasked with maximizing. Individuals reconstruct models of the
utility function with sample points and memory of information discussed by other individuals (upper left
inset). v1,j (j = 1, 2, ...p) denote sample points created separately for each individual at initialization. vi,j
(i = 2, 3, ...n, j = 1, 2, ...q) denote sample points acquired through discussion. p and q are the number of
sample points at initialization and the capacity for memory, respectively. The oldest sample points are omitted
as the new are included if capacity has been ﬁlled. With the individual utility function an agent performs a
local search for optima, producing an individual plan with a speciﬁc value for each aspect of the problem, a1
... am. When considering which aspect to propose for incorporation into the group plan a speaker compares
the expected difference in utility for each aspect. Proposals promising higher utility are ranked with higher
importance values. The resulting list of relative importance values is a probability distribution for deciding
on the aspect to be proposed, i1 ... im. After a proposal individuals record the suggested plan as a point in
their memory and vote on its acceptance to the group plan.
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3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Overview
We present a model for illuminating the obstructive effects of mental models in relation to harnessing col-
lective intelligence for complex tasks. We investigate group decision-making where individual actions derive
from hardwired intelligence and circumstantial conditions. We charge groups with the task of solving multi-
dimensional optimization problems. Individual perception of the problem space is unique, incomplete, noisy,
and localized. One group solution, alterable only by a group consensus, coexists with individual solutions.
A schematic illustration of the model is shown in Figure 1. A group consisting of n individuals discusses
a solution to an optimization problem in m dimensions. Each individual has a model of a true utility function
reconstructed from sample points that may be either uniquely their own or gained through discussion. At
the initialization of a group, each individual extracts p random sample points from the true utility function
distorted by some noise, η, where the boundary conditions of η ∈ [0, 1] describe pure ﬁdelity and random
noise. With the sample points they interpolate a model. Throughout discussion, proposals are recorded in the
memories of others creating a secondary, dynamic source of sample points.
There exists one group solution and separate individual solutions. Each individual maintains a location in
the problem space as their own solution. Individual solutions may be modiﬁed by adapting a proposal or by
local searches spanning a small fraction of the entire space. Proposals address a single aspect in one of the m
dimensions. When speaking to the group an agent ranks the importance of various aspects by comparison to
the group plan. Those which would improve the utility of the plan are ranked highest.
A group votes on the acceptance of a proposal with some consensus function. If a large enough portion
of the group agrees, then the group solution is modiﬁed by adopting the proposal. Individuals may accept
proposals to change the group plan while not adopting the suggestion themselves if the difference between
speaker and listener solution preferences are near in the problem space. If a listener adopts the speaker’s
proposal by adjusting their own solution however, it is assumed that they accept the proposal for the group
plan as well.
3.2.2 Problem Space
Groups of n individuals form a model of their environment and attempt to decide on a single optimal plan.
The environment is a multi-dimensional, nonlinear utility function that is only partially visible to individuals
at a single point in time. Navigating the problem space entails searching in each dimension for a maximal
solution. The utility function is a summation of a set of orthogonal sinusoids in m dimensions:
27
f(x1, ..., xm) =
m∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
sin(ωjxi) (3.1)
where k is the number of superposed frequencies in a single dimension and frequencies are randomly gen-
erated such that ωj ∈ [0, 50]. The function, f , is normalized within the range of [0,1]. Agents are charged
with the task of ﬁnding the maximal solution to f , for which they initially receive a limited set of randomly
selected sample solutions.
3.2.3 Mental Model Formation
A mental model is created with an interpolating algorithm using inverse squared distances for localized
weighted averages:
f ′(vu) =
∑
for all i,j f(vi,j)‖vi,j − vu‖−2∑
for all i,j ‖vi,j − vu‖−2
(3.2)
where the set of known solutions is used to guess the utility at some space vector, vu.
In addition to existing in a common environment, agents share information about their own models
through discussion. Speakers report their current proposal and the related utility value expected. Listen-
ers save this information and treat it as one of their own sample points if they are assigned with a capacity
for memory, q ∈ N, that denotes the number of points shared in discussion an agent will remember for each
other agent. q is the main parameter of interest in the results presented here.
If the process of sharing data is iterated, recursive models emerge that are similar to the behavior demon-
strated by Theory of Mind [21, 7]. Since an agent models the environment with all points included in their
memory, subsequent models are blends of the previous models of all members of a group. The iterative com-
bination of models leads to a nontrivial reformation of all models and some amount of homogeneity within
a limited region. Even for the case of a single memory space for discussion inﬁnite recursion is realized
through a continuous chain of hysteresis from one statement to the next.
3.2.4 Group Interactions
Individual and group solutions are randomly localized in the solution space. A round of group interactions is
a sequence of events:
1. Individual, localized searches
2. Discussion of and potentially the altering of the group solution
3. Altering of individual solutions in response to shared information
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We assume a human-like predicament of shortsightedness: in addition to having incomplete information,
a single agent at any point in time may sweep only a tiny fraction of their own, modeled solution space. The
scope of a local search, where s is the diameter of the space searchable, is conﬁned to a small fraction of
the entire problem space. Theoretically an individual might hill-climb across the entire space in a dimension
within a single simulation.
Following local optimization, a speaker is randomly selected to discuss a single component of the group
solution. In order to decide on a topic to discuss, individuals may rank each component of theirm-dimensional
solution as it separately relates to the plan. An expected change of utility to the group plan is calculated for
each possible proposal, comparing utility values for of each potential plan with respect to the speaker’s model.
The topic of the proposal is chosen probabilistically in proportion to the relative expected increase of utility
to the plan.
The speaker suggests some change in a certain dimension, mi, to the existing plan, whereupon the re-
maining members vote as to acceptance or rejection of the change. There are two avenues for acceptance
manifested in individual and social decisions. Individuals compare the suggested location to their current so-
lution by way of their own model. If it appears to be a better solution they adopt the strategy themselves and
as a modiﬁcation to the group plan. In the case of an inferior suggestion an individual may still accept a pro-
posal with some probability related to nearness to their own plan. The following is the algorithm performed
when generating a decision for each listening group member:
Algorithm 3.2.1: ACCEPTQ(sp, sa)
if f(sp)− f(sa) > 0
then
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
Accept
sa ← sp
else if r < e−(ΔD
2)/T
then Accept
where sp and sa represent the proposed and an agent’s own plan, respectively, r is a random number in
[0,1], ΔD is the distance between the two plans, ‖sp − sa‖, and T is a function of the time analogous to
the temperature in an annealing system as described below. The then clause is executed in the case of both
individual and social acceptance, otherwise the else if clause demonstrates the probability with which an
individual accepts a proposal socially, while maintaining their own solution.
A group consensus is created from the set of votes by means of a parameterized fractional value. An
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accepted proposal is fully enacted, shifting the group solution for future discussion, otherwise no change is
made.
3.2.5 Simulated Annealing
It has been demonstrated that time-differentiated exploration of a solution space for complex, multifaceted
problems results in signiﬁcantly superior results for pairs of semi-antagonistic agents attempting to negotiate
mutually optimal contracts in comparison to paired hill-climbing strategies [9]. We implement a version of the
simulated-annealing protocol pertinent to group dynamics. Simulated annealing facilitates a wide exploration
of the solution space, while maintaining the general structure of a goal oriented group. The probability of
an individual accepting a proposal socially is an exponential function of the distance from their own solution
preference and the temperature:
P(Accept) = e(−ΔD)
2/T (3.3)
where ΔD is the distance of their own position from a suggested solution as it is described in Algorithm II.1,
and the temperature, T , is a linear function of the inverse of the proportion of the total time used
T (ti, tf ) = α
tf
ti
, (3.4)
where ti, tf , and α are the present time, the ﬁnal time, and a constant, respectively. Annealing is restricted
to the social acceptance level, since implementation on the individual level of acceptance would lead to a
premature convergence of all individuals for the low-dimensional solution space cases we concentrate on in
the following section.
Algorithm 3.2.2: CONSENSUS(ν, ti, tf )
if 1+νn >
ti
tf
then make change to group solution
else do not change group solution
where ν is the number of acceptance votes from listeners.
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3.3 Results
The results presented share some common parameter settings. The diameter of local searches, s = 0.01; the
number of sinusoids composing each dimension, k = 5; the number of sample points, p = 20; the constant
of temperature, α = 0.05; and noise, η = 0.2. The remaining parameters were varied: the number of agents,
n; dimensions, m; simulation time, tf ; and memory size, q.
3.3.1 Memoryless Agents: Disparate Groups
Parameters: m = 2, n = {3, 6}, q = 0, tf = 100
Without sharing information, trajectories generally do not tend to converge. Figure 2a shows a situation
in which the coalition of two agents (green and red) has excluded a third (cyan) from contributing, and placed
the solution in an area unknown to any agent. Figure 3a demonstrates the complete obviation of the group;
the group solution resides at the location of a single agent while the entire group is dispersed in space. At
the most, groups may generate a collective perception and decision by effecting the locality of individuals
through interactions. If agents are separated, only relating to each other through proposals, not knowledge,
then a greater exploration of the solution space ensues because they are unable to agree on one solution. The
solution however, is not insured to be the optimal solution of all known in the group, or even an optimum for
that matter.
3.3.2 Single Unit of Memory: Convergence
Parameters: m = 2, n = {3, 6}, q = 1, tf = 100
When information is shared in a task oriented context, restrictions to the scope of discussion emerge. An
agent stores one sample point mentioned by each other agent in discussion when q = 1. The most recently
mentioned proposal always replaces previous memory. With this subtle difference we notice a dramatic shift
in behavior. Groups often spontaneously converge on a highly discussed region and this prohibits a thorough
exploration of all possible solutions. Figure 2b demonstrates one simulation in which such a convergence
occurred. The stark difference in behavior between the two simulations shown in Figure 2 derives from a
slight difference in conditions. Agents in Figure 2b have each been alloted one memory space for every
other agent so that they may store the last reported value of a speaker and incorporate this into their own
model of the world. This minimal condition leads to an inﬁnite recursion of models like that seen in agents
demonstrating a Theory of Mind.
A minimal amount of information in a relevant region is sufﬁcient to produce coordinated behavior. For
this model, groups of larger sizes than three typically fraction into subgroups, but converge for the subgroups
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(a) q = 0
(b) q = 1
Figure 3.2: Trajectories of agents and group solutions in a simple, two-dimensional problem space. Individual
agents’ paths and the group solution are shown in dashed and solid lines respectively. Final positions are
designated by points, the group solution being of a larger size. (a) All individuals resort to hill-climbing
strategies without the sharing of information (q = 0 ). The ﬁnal group plan is oscillating. (b) The group
quickly converges on a single solution while sharing a minimal amount (q = 1). The ﬁnal group plan is
stable. Parameters: m = 2, n = 3, q = {0, 1}, tf = 100
formed, with the group solution residing at one of the subgroups’ locations as shown in Figure 3b.
3.3.3 Formation of Shared Mental Models
Parameters: m = 2, n = 2, q = 40, tf = 100
The emergence of shared mental models is represented in Figure 4 by the homogeneity of models in
some region that appears to hold the solution to the problem. Initially, agents view an issue differently.
The topology of Agent 1’s model signiﬁcantly evolves to resemble that of Agent 2, while the converse is
true: Agent 2 moderates the gradient of the optimum in its own model. The regions nonadjacent to the area
discussed change very little, with the differences between models becoming exasperated for some regions
above the mutual solution area. Agents have the capacity to agree only within the range of discussed regions.
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(a) q = 0
(b) q = 1
Figure 3.3: Formation of coalitions in large groups. Individual agents’ paths and the group solution are shown
in dashed and solid lines respectively. Final positions are designated by points, the group solution being of a
larger size. (a) Larger groups are not necessarily more likely to form a coalition. This group demonstrates the
same diffuse characteristic as the group of size n = 3 in Figure 2a (q = 0). (b) Two subgroups form around
different local optima (q = 1 ). Parameters: m = 2, n = 6, q = {0, 1}, tf = 100
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Figure 3.4: Utility functions perceived by two agents’ and the formation of shared mental models. The legend
on the right describes a function for mapping colors to utility values and differences between models. Two
individuals come to agree upon a range of solutions in which they initially differed (top charts). After 100
time steps they have converged on a local maximum in the bottom left of the charts and shared the same
expected values for local solutions. Parameters: m = 2, n = 2, q = 40, tf = 100
A limitation to the total possible convergence of models is seen at approximately the the same capacity for
memory, q = 40 in Figure 6.
3.3.4 Convergence with respect to Memory
Parameters:n = 3,m = {2, 8}, q = {0, 1...10}, tf = 200
In low-dimensional problems, the capability to agree on a single group solution appears in conjunction
with a decrease in exploration of the problem space. Figure 5a shows the sharp drop in the time it takes a
group to converge on a plan with respect to memory. The performance with respect to the real function, f ,
remains the same in both cases. Exploration is offset by a lack of cohesion in the former case, and cohesion is
offset by premature convergence in the latter. If convergence on a ﬁnal plan were more gradual, then beneﬁts
of both group cohesion and a good exploration of the problem space might be demonstrated in a single group.
We investigated problems of higher dimensions, hoping to ﬁnd, as it has been shown for humans [25],
that complex group level dynamics are more relevant for problems of greater complexity. The results show
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the contrary.
Comparing behavior in higher dimensional problems to lower dimensional cases reveals curiously sim-
ilar dynamics. Figure 5a shows the amount of total time used to converge on a group solution for a two-
dimensional problem, where convergence is deﬁned by the sum of the distances of agents’ solutions from the
group solution, as being below a threshold Dth = 0.04.
Dgroup =
n∑
i=1
‖si − sgroup‖ (3.5)
For higher dimensional cases, groups fail to converge on a single solution. The metric of individual
distances from the ﬁnal group plan is used to measure group cohesion. Figure 5b shows Dgroup at for the
ﬁnal simulation time with respect to q. Although groups fail to agree on one solution, the introduction of
memory has a similar inﬂuence to that of the two-dimensional case.
The property described in Figure 4 that is the most obvious culprit of the condition portrayed in Figures
5a and 5b. A quick convergence to a limited region of the solution space limits the amount to which agents
can effect each other by sharing novel information. We might expect the same results in higher dimensional
problem spaces based on the similar trend in Figures 5a and 5b.
3.3.5 Limitation of Information Sharing
Parameters:n = 3,m = 2, q = 100, tf = 100
Figure 6 shows the inability of a group to share one model of a problem despite the group acceptance
of a single solution. The sharing of information is bounded because discussion does not leave the local area
of the group solution once the solution is found. This condition may be a major limiting factor in groups of
individuals that take a brute force approach to solving problems such that each individual learns more and
groups work together for an extended period of time. If discussion is limited to a small region of the solution
space, then all other information is neglected regardless of time and memory constraints.
We see illustrated in this last ﬁgure the essence of difﬁculties in problem solving with groups. Com-
plex problems meriting the attention of humans do not lack more extensive descriptions or improved lookup
mechanisms for retrieving existing information. The crucial issue is one of synthesis. The obstruction behind
which lie the greatest advancements of human intelligence is a need for a dynamical awareness of existing
and potential information along with the maintenance of ﬂuid group cohesion throughout intelligent navi-
gation of a problem space. Figure 6 demonstrates the prominence of this obstruction as a consequence of
mental model formation in anthropomimetic groups.
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Figure 3.5: Results of Monte Carlo simulations: convergence on a solution is shown for 2-D and 8-D prob-
lems. (a) The fraction of tf needed for a group to come within a threshold distance, Dth = 0.04, to the
group solution is shown as a function of memory capacity. Groups of explore a 2-D space. (b) The sum of
all individuals’ distances from the group plan. Groups exploring an eight-dimensional space are no longer
converging on single solutions, but demonstrate a similar improvement with the introduction of memory. (In
eight-dimensional, euclidean space, the longest distance that can be traced in a unit hypercube is
√
8 = 2.83)
Parameters: n = 3,m = {2, 8}, tf = 200
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Figure 3.6: Results of Monte Carlo simulations: the average difference between any two members of a group
is measured as the average difference in the value of a solution over a large set of randomly selected location
(numerically equivalent to the integral of the difference of the two models). The dashed line, y = 0.19, is an
approximation of the minimum heterogeneity in a group. Parameters: m = 2, n = 3, q = 100, tf = 100
3.4 Discussion
Shared mental model formation in anthropomimetic groups demonstrates unique, counterintuitive behavior.
For low-dimensional cases of any capacity for memory, discussion rapidly curtails exploration and produces
a crowding of some solution region. The local area of the group solution is changed for all agents to express
homogeneity when compared across individuals. Sameness of models and emergence of cooperation are
simultaneously appearing phenomena, for which a direction of causality cannot be deﬁned.
The nature of the shared mental model formation can be qualitatively described as smoothing and av-
eraging differences in a highly discussed region, while leaving a high level of heterogeneity in undiscussed
areas. Rapid convergence on solitary solutions are a result of both the arbitrary preference of one solution
over unexplored others, and the avoidance of lower valued regions of a solution space. Our model indicates
that large reserves for memory, exceeding an agent’s own space for saving sample points, does not necessary
lead to a better understanding of a large portion of the solution space, moreover in some conditions this will
lead to a limited exploration of the limited knowledge that does exist.
The crucial limitation to collective intelligence lies in the antagonistic relationship between convergence
and exploration. Convergence can be perceived here as a representation of the context of the communal
information reservoir. A fuzzy boundary of the convergent region becomes the backdrop for a qualiﬁcation of
information. That which is used and accepted lies within, all else having been rejected. Without a framework
for qualifying discussion, the group cannot process information. Individuals may discuss every slight detail
of their knowledge with each other, but the interaction would be moot if lacking intelligence on the receiving
end of the exchange.
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In addition to the necessity for an implicit qualiﬁer of information passing through group discussion, it’s
initial absence constrains creation to the scope of the actual conversation. The generation of meaning must be
demonstrated through sequential, responsive acts of speaking and listening by individual agents, from which
the backdrop pattern emerges. In the context of an optimization problem the appropriate pattern describes a
convergence on an optimal solution. The probability of exploring possibilities beyond the area of convergence
diminishes as consensus is reached and the border of the discussion region contracts.
Individual agents negotiate a differences in locality and mental models of the problem space. The intro-
duction of mental models of others modiﬁes the expression of these conﬂicts and shifts the balance between
convergence and exploration. We explored the relationships between these opposing forces in attempts to
form a framework for describing balance in the context of group level behavior. Assuming a limitation of
perception as characteristic of human beings, agents are capable of sweeping only a small fraction of their
models at once. Consequently, neither the capacity for memory nor increasingly accurate models may im-
prove behavior after a certain extent. The protocol of interaction must be manipulated to change group
behavior driven performance. For problems of higher dimensionality it may be necessary to employ the
simulated annealing protocol on the level of individual acceptance for the development of a cohesive group
centered on a single group solution.
3.5 Conclusion
To identify limitations to group level intelligence and propose possible solutions, we investigate dynamics
of group decision making processes on complex problems when individuals are capable of forming men-
tal models of others based on the history of the group discussion. Our results suggest a counter-intuitive
possibility that as the capacity of memory increases, the amount of information sharing may decrease far
below the entire problem space. This is due to premature convergence of group discussion on a particular
solution; incorporating knowledge from others into one’s own world view creates a local agreement, leaving
unexplored diversities beyond the scope of discussion. The mechanisms stiﬂing group level exploration and
possible protocols for overstepping local optima are discussed.
Connecting groups of individuals by allowing not only reactive, but also cooperative generative relation-
ships, in which every individual partly authors the perception of others in parallel to a group focus on solving
a particular problem leads to dramatic changes in group behavior. The transition from solitary hill-climbers as
in the case of Figure 1a to a group demonstrating premature convergence of a single solution is so sharply pro-
nounced that a large range of behaviors in between remain unexplored. The possibility of simulating higher
dimensional problems and implementing a strong simulated annealing protocol appears to be a promising
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direction for future research.
In order to encourage a more diverse discourse and the revealing of so-called “hidden information” [8],
the protocol of interaction may need be manipulated, both to sustain some distance of opinions for the sake of
maintaining an interesting conversation, and to overcome a repulsion to lower-valued solution areas in favor
of a more thorough exploration of all possibilities. The eventual convergence on a solution is paramount
in group problem solving, especially in the context of complex and nonlinear problems where the region
between two competing strategies or coalitions of strategies is most likely not nearly as favorable as either
solution itself.
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Abstract
Team decision making dynamics are investigated from a novel perspective by shifting agency from decision
makers to representations of potential solutions. We provide a new way to navigate social dynamics of
collective decision making by interpreting decision makers as constituents of an evolutionary environment
of an ecology of evolving solutions. We demonstrate distinct patterns of evolution with respect to three
forms of variation: (1) Results with random variations in utility functions of individuals indicate that groups
demonstrating minimal internal variation produce higher true utility values of group solutions and display
better convergence; (2) analysis of variations in behavioral patterns within a group shows that a proper balance
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between selective and creative evolutionary forces is crucial to producing adaptive solutions; and (3) biased
variations of the utility functions diminish the range of variation for potential solution utility, leaving only the
differential of convergence performance static. We generally ﬁnd that group cohesion (low random variation
within a group) and composition (appropriate variation of behavioral patterns within a group) are necessary
for a successful navigation of the solution space, but performance in both cases is susceptible to group level
biases.
4.1 Introduction
Collective decision making is becoming more central and indispensable in human society as modern problems
increasingly involve interactivity and inseparability within large scale tasks [4]. In high-tech product and
software development, for example, the amount of workers participating in a design project can be in the
order of thousands as a result of a products complexity exceeding an individuals capacity, which almost
inevitably results in suboptimal outcomes [5]. More recently, online collective decision making among large
populations of anonymous participants via computer mediated networks has been implemented for product
rating and common knowledge base formation. Both individual behavior and the organizational structure
greatly inﬂuence decision processes. The complexity of the processes is more manifested when constituents
of groups are heterogeneous with regard to both their world views and behavioral propensities. Collective
human decision making in such conditions is poorly understood, being one of the most signiﬁcant challenges
in the social sciences.
The leadership, psychology and organizational behavior/management disciplines have examined col-
lective dynamics using both experimental and applied studies. They generally emphasize linear statistical
relationships of team and individual level variables [4], without accounting for nonlinear processes, high-
dimensional problem space and non-trivial social structure. Complex, nonlinear problem space has been
considered in dynamical modeling studies [5], in which interdependence of aspects of problem are consid-
ered, but not nontrivial social interactions. Here we investigate collective decision making dynamics from a
novel perspective by shifting the focus of agency from group members to potential solutions being discussed.
The decision making processes are described using concepts in evolutionary theory, where evolution acts on
a population of potential solutions through mechanisms of selection and variation as effected by human dis-
cussants. Group members thus serve both as an evolutionary environment and as implements of evolutionary
action on a population of solutions. Within this context, several evolutionary operators can be mapped to hu-
man behaviors. Examples include replication (advocacy of an existing idea), subtractive selection (criticism
against an existing idea), mutation (revision of an existing idea) and recombination (creation of a new idea
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by mixing existing ideas).
4.2 Model
4.2.1 Groups
We apply evolutionary framework to model simple group decision making processes within a small-sized,
well-connected social network structure. We conduct multiple levels of analysis [1, 7] on how homogeneities
or heterogeneities of world views/goals among the participating agents, as well as group-level behavioral
patterns and biases, affect the decision making dynamics and the ﬁnal outcomes [2].
When group members are heterogeneous in world views, differences between individual utility functions
play a crucial role in determining the group dynamics; the relevant level of analysis is within groups. Each
member acts as group parts [1] to achieve individual objectives. Conﬂicts of interest make the problem
space more complex than that of groups consisting of homogeneous, world perspectives. On such complex
landscapes there is more possibility for populations to become stuck at local optima, detrimenting the overall
adaptiveness. Contingently, the importance of variation relates to escaping from the local optima in order to
reach better solutions.
If group members are homogeneous in their world view, they behave as group wholes [1]; the relevant
level of analysis is between groups. The population of solutions evolves to adapt to a single utility function
shared by all the group members, so the problem space would be simpler than with heterogeneous groups.
With little conﬂicts of interest, selection is relatively important to adaptiveness as speeding up the convergence
of discussion. Variation still holds importance, especially with complex nonlinear problems.
Our model assumes that groups are initiated with a list of randomly generated ideas, whereupon they
begin to perform a set of actions on the existing population of solutions repeatedly for a ﬁxed number of
iterations. Individuals always act in the same order and groups always demonstrate a full rotation. The
number of actions on the population of solutions is a product of the number of group members, N , and the
number of iterations, t.
In the population, there may be multiple copies of the same type of solution, which represents the rel-
ative popularity among group members. Each action is performed on a single copy of solution, not on an
equivalence class of all solution replicates.
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4.2.2 Utility Functions
Groups are situated in anM -dimensional binary problem space, with 2M possible solutions. For a simulation,
every solution has a utility value speciﬁed by a master utility function U that is unavailable to group members.
Individuals perceive solution utility values based on their own utility functionsUj constructed by adding noise
to U . We develop a semi-continuous assignment of utility values in the problem space in the following way.
First, s representative solutions S = {vi} (i = 1 . . . s) are generated as random bit strings, where each vi
represents one solution made of M bits. One solution is assigned the maximum ﬁtness value, 1, and another,
the minimum ﬁtness value, 0. The remaining s − 2 solutions are assigned a random real value between 0
and 1, ensuring that the entire range of utility values is from 0 to 1, for the sake of comparisons between
simulation results. The utility values of all possible solutions in the domain of the master utility function
are deﬁned by interpolation using the utility values of representative solutions in S. We use the Hamming
distance as a measure of dissimilarity between two bit strings. With this measure, the utility value of each
possible solution not present in S is calculated as a weighted average of the utility values of the representative
solutions calculated as follows:
U(v) =
s∑
i=1
U(vi ·D(vi, v)−2)
s∑
i=1
D(vi, v)−2
(4.1)
where v /∈ S is the solution in question, U(vi) is the utility of a representative solution νi in S, and
D(vi, v) is the Hamming distance between vi and v. Each individual in a group will unconsciously have
a different set of utility values for the possible solutions of the problem. Individual utility functions Ui(v)
(j = 1 . . . N) are generated by adding random noise to the master utility function so that:
Uj(v) ∈ [max(U(v)− ν, 0),min(U(v) + ν, 1)] (4.2)
for all v , where ν is the parameter that determines the range of noise. Individuals do not access global
maximum/minimum utility values, though they can retrieve a utility value from the function when a speciﬁc
solution is given.
In addition to individual deviations from a common master utility function, we investigate the effect of
common deviations from the true utility function, or group level biases. For simulating group level bias we
introduce a new step in the generation of individual utility functions, in which the master utility function
U(v) differs from the original true utility function, UT (v) . Speciﬁcally, a bias β is imposed on the true
utility function both by ﬂipping bits with probability 0.25 β per bit and adding a random number ranged
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[−β, β] to utility values. Solution sets are renormalized to the range [0, 1]. The master utility function is
generated from the biased representative solution set. Subsequent methods follow as described above. Bias
represents ﬁdelity of information at the group level, where β = 0 denotes perfect information, and complete
randomization is asymptotically approached as bias increases.
4.2.3 Evolutionary Operators
We identify six evolutionary operators representing individual behaviors reﬂecting selection or variation.
Some operators use a preferential search algorithm to stochastically search the solution population, where rp
solutions are randomly selected and ranked according to their perceived utility values, and then the best or
worst solution is selected depending on the nature of the operator being executed.
Replication. Replication adds an exact copy of a solution from the population of solutions back onto
the list. Solutions are chosen for replication with the preferential search algorithm. Replication therefore
can neither produce a novel solution nor remove one, but it gently sways the ecology of the population by
increasing the popularity of favorable existent solutions. This represents an advocacy of a particular solution
under discussion.
Random point mutation. Random point mutation adds a copy of a solution with point mutations, ﬂip-
ping of bits at each aspect of a problem with a probability pm. The solution on which the operator acts is
chosen from the active population with a preferential search algorithm (discussed in more detail below). This
represents an attempt of making random changes to the existing ideas, reﬂected in asking what if questions.
Random point mutations help escape local maxima of a utility function in the problem space when a utility
function is nonlinear and many-peaked.
Intelligent point mutation. A solution is selected from the population with a preferential search algo-
rithm. It makes several (rm) offspring of the parent solution and selects that of the highest perceived ﬁtness
for addition to the population. This represents a proposal of an improved idea derived from existing ideas
under discussion. The intelligent point mutation can be useful in maximizing a utility function with one
maximum by climbing monotone gradients, but it may perform poorly in a complex utility landscape.
Recombination. Recombination chooses one solution at random and one with a preferential search
algorithm. It then creates two offspring from the two parent solutions. Sexual reproduction is simulated with
a multiple point cross-over recombination: parent solutions are aligned by aspects, for each of which there is
a probability ps of switching their contents. Of the two offspring, that of higher perceived utility is selected
and added to the population. This represents a creation of a new idea from two existing ideas.
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Subtractive selection. The preferential search algorithm is used to ﬁnd the solution with the worst
ﬁtness, whereupon it is singled out and deleted from the population. This represents a criticism against a bad
idea. Subtractive selection is the only operator that reduces the number of existing solutions and is therefore
essential to groups attempting to attain convergence in the population distribution.
Random generation. Finally, random generation of solutions adds a randomly generated solution to the
population. There is no use of an individuals utility function, nor any connection to the existing solutions on
the table at that time. New solutions are generated utterly randomly. This represents a sudden inspiration of
a totally unique idea that is unrelated to the existing ideas under discussion.
4.2.4 Simulation Settings
The following parameter settings were held constant for all simulations: group size N = 6; problem space
dimensionality M = 10; number of sample solutions in the preferential search algorithm rp = 5; number
of offspring generated in the intelligent point mutation rm = 5; random mutation rate per bit pm = 0.2;
probability of random switching in recombination ps = 0.4; number of iterations t = 60. It was also
assumed that groups were initialized with four random ideas. For each group, the noise parameter ν and the
bias parameter β were varied from 0 to 1.2 by increments of 0.2.
4.2.5 Metrics of Group Performance
We use two separate performance metrics: the true utility of the mode solution at the end of group simulation
and the convergence of solutions. Convergence is based on entropy
H = −
n∑
i=1
p(xi) · log2 p(xi) (4.3)
, where p(xi) is a normalized frequency of the i-th type of solutions in the population. Since the maximum
possible value of H is M (this is the case when there are exactly 2M solutions in the population which are
different from each other), M −H is a quantitative measure that intuitively means the number of aspects of
the problem on which the group has formed a cohesive opinion. For normality, we will use (M −H)/M as
the metric.
4.3 Results
We ﬁrst conducted a within-group analysis examining effects of heterogeneity in world views (utility func-
tions) within a group. Here we assumed group members were balanced behaviorally; in each iteration, they
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Figure 4.1: Simulation results showing the effects of within-group heterogeneity and group level bias. The
level of convergence and the true utility value of mode solutions for several different noise levels are plotted.
ν = 0 represents the case of completely homogeneous groups, while larger values of ν represent more hetero-
geneous group cases and larger values of bias represent large discrepancies between group utility functions
and true utility function.
randomly chose one of the six operators with equal probability. Figure 1 indicates the results with several
different settings of within-group variation ν and group-level bias β, plotting them in a 2-D performance
space using the two metrics described above.
Group-level bias affects the utility of group solutions while convergence is largely unaffected. On the
other hand, within-group variation degrades both convergence and utility. Groups performed better in both
performance metrics when they were homogeneous in their utility functions. As the groups members become
more heterogeneous, the true utility value of the mode solution decreased and the ﬁnal population of solutions
after discussion became more diverse. The decrease of the true utility value was particularly drastic; in
nonbiased conditions with no heterogeneity, the groups were able to ﬁnd nearly perfect solutions for the
problem (i.e., the utility close to 1). As the groups become more heterogeneous the utility achieved dropped
to just above 0.5, meaning that there was no net improvement achieved during the group discussion. This was
due to the conﬂicts of interest among the group members.
Contrary to other ﬁndings regarding heterogeneous groups outperforming homogeneous groups on cre-
ative and intellectual problem solving tasks [3, 6], our ﬁndings indicate the opposite, which may seem to
support the negative relationship reported between both surface-level (i.e., demographic) and deep-level (i.e.,
psychological) diversity and group functioning and performance [2]. We must note here, however, that the
diversity considered in this set of experiments is about the individual utility functions only, and not about the
individual behavioral patterns.
In order to explore the effects of various compositions of individual behaviors, we ran another set of ex-
periments using the same simulation model with different behavioral patterns assumed for different groups. In
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forming different group properties, we modeled only a handful of potential evolutionary operators/behaviors
combinations. We modeled some operators singularly (e.g., random generation was the only operator within
the group), and for other groups we combined two evolutionary operators to reﬂect increasing complexity
of group behavior (e.g., recombination and intelligent point mutation). For the former cases group members
were assumed to choose the designated operator for 95% of their total actions, with 1% for each of the other
ﬁve operators. For the latter combined cases they were assumed to choose each of the two operators for 48%
of their total actions (96% in total), with 1% for each of the other four operators. We limited our examination
to eight group types: replication and subtractive selection (Group 1); subtractive selection and random point
mutation (Group 2); replication and recombination (Group 3); recombination (Group 4); recombination and
intelligent point mutation (Group 5); intelligent point mutation and random generation (Group 6); random
generation (Group 7); and, ﬁnally, the balanced team we used in the previous experiment as a control (Group
0).
Figure 2 shows the results of the second set of experiments comparing group performances with different
group properties, plotting them in the same 2-D performance space as used for Figure 1. The effect of
group-level bias is similar to that seen in Figure 1. Among the groups examined, the balanced Group 0 case
was the best in terms of the utility value of the mode solution. Interestingly, however, we saw a variety of
different group performances achieved by groups with different properties, seen as a kind of wave front near
the upper-right corner of the performance space.
We further noticed in Figure 2 that the groups that sit along this wave front were arranged roughly in the
order of the balance between selection and variation in evolutionary operators; Group 1, which was the best
in terms of the convergence but poor in the mode selection utility, used the combination of replication and
subtractive selection, which are both selection-oriented operators. Group 2, the second best in convergence
and second worst in mode selection utility within the wave front, used the combination of subtractive selection
and random point mutation, which is more variation-oriented than Group 1. Along the way toward Group 0,
we saw Group 3 (replication and recombination), Group 4 (recombination only), and Group 5 (recombination
and intelligent point mutation), where the qualitative shift of balance of evolutionary operators from selection-
oriented to variation-oriented can be seen. It is also notable that the random generation operators (used in
Groups 6 and 7) were generally not working for improving group performance.
4.4 Conclusion
The application of the evolutionary paradigm is illuminating for studying collective decision making dynam-
ics because it allows the researcher to remove themselves from the traditional teleology adopted in most
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Figure 4.2: Simulation results showing the effects of group-level difference of behavioral patterns. The level
of convergence and the true utility value of mode solutions under varying conditions of group-level behavioral
patterns and bias are plotted. Group 0 is the balanced team that uses all of the six evolutionary operators with
equal probability; Group 1 uses replication and subtractive selection mostly; Group 2 subtractive selection
and random point mutation; Group 3 replication and recombination; Group 4 recombination only; Group 5
recombination and intelligent point mutation; Group 6 intelligent point mutation and random generation; and
Group 7 random generation only.
simulations of human groups. We have portrayed group dynamics in a novel way by treating members of the
group as constituents of an evolutionary environment in which populations of solutions evolve. In this new
framework, we have characterized the properties of the population of solutions after discussion as quantitative
metrics of the performance of a group. We demonstrated through simulations that heterogeneous groups with
random variations in individual utility functions had a drop in both utility and convergence of solution popu-
lations compared to more homogeneous groups. We also demonstrated that variations in the compositions of
individual behavioral patterns between groups resulted in a large spectrum of performance, in which groups
well balanced between reductive and creative evolutionary forces yielded solutions that were highly adaptive
by both performance metrics. All operators have a particular utility in appropriate circumstances, but we
highlight that recombination operators are particularly important in that they demonstrate creative changes
on large and small scales with a single mechanism, as are selection operators essential to promoting the best
ideas by converging a solution population on the best solutions.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
Modeling social systems is dually problematic. Social systems are complex in themselves and the literature
of scientiﬁc tools is disparate and often contradictory. I have worked towards reconciling modeling ap-
proaches focused on cognitive mechanisms and modeling approaches focused on evolutionary mechanisms.
I demonstrated three original studies that have focused on one or both of the two mechanisms and we present
arguments for creating a uniﬁed theory of social dynamics.
In the ﬁrst study we demonstrated a new form of altruistic punishment, in which individuals who punish
are also more likely to cheat. We use agent based modeling to simulate a repeated public goods game. We
show that altruism and punishment become negatively correlated for a range of parameters, leading to selﬁsh
punishment. The study is a social simulation based entirely on assumptions of evolutionary mechanisms. All
events are determined directly by phenotypes and genetic algorithms. We study the emergence of an selﬁsh
punishers that are dependent upon the coexistence of non-punishing altruists. Selﬁsh behavior is generally
considered simply a negative trait for group well-being. Most studies seek explanations for its suppression,
such as studies investigating altruistic punishment [25, 26, 15, 12, 11, 5, 10, 16, 9]. Because punishment is
often difﬁcult to execute in reality it comes at a cost to the punisher and is therefore second order altruism
[25, 3, 4, 9]. We were able to demonstrate a polymorphism that couples ﬁrst order selﬁshness with second
order altruism.
In the second study we investigated effects of mental model formation on collective decision making pro-
cesses. Groups of individuals attempt to come to consensus on problems in complex problem spaces, where
each individual possesses imperfect information, a limited scope of their own model of problem space, and
a plastic view of the problem space varying depending both on original imperfect information and a mem-
ory of group solution suggestions. This model is based entirely on an interaction of cognitive mechanisms
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and hard-wired social dynamics. There is no genetic component. We explored mechanisms described in the
theory of social situatedness [20, 22] and Theory of Mind (ToM) models [6, 19, 7, 23, 17]. Explanatory
models for social situatedness and ToM usually assume evolutionary dynamics. We investigated the effects
of ToM in noncompetitive scenarios where all agents work together to solve a single problem. We found that
greater capacities for assimilating information from others can potentially lead to premature agreements and
suboptimal explorations of problem space.
In the third and last study cognitive mechanisms are modeled as evolutionary mechanisms. We model
team decision making dynamics. By treating people as an evolutionary environment within which ideas
propagate and evolve, we are able to include cognitive and evolutionary mechanisms. We demonstrate that a
process of collective decision making can work very much like an ecosystem over time, evolving an ecology
of ideas and variably with respect to the propensities of team members towards various social actions. Studies
recorded in the leadership, psychology and organizational behavior disciplines have investigated collective
dynamics of groups in decision processes but they often focus on single variable statistics, failing to explore
complex scenarios of social interactions and problem formats [18]. We implemented an ABM approach to
study more complex scenarios.
In the ABM construct it is possible to develop models reconciling approaches focusing on cognitive and
evolutionary mechanisms. I will brieﬂy note that the effects of the two are not necessarily distinguishable:
An evolutionary system may give rise to agents with capacity for cognitive interactions. An agent making
a mental model of an other, for example, may arise as an emergent property of coevolving predator-prey
species. Cognitive mechanisms included in the assumptions of a model, however, differ from evolutionary
mechanisms in that they model thinking and its effects on the interactions between agents. One avenue to
reconciling the two approaches was demonstrated in the third study, in which we created a reversal of the
traditional evolutionary paradigm: actors with agency are, rather than the units upon which an evolutionary
machine acts directly, considered part of an ecological environment in which decisions evolve and collective
behaviors emerge. Additionally, as our understanding of cognitive mechanisms such as ToM greaten and as
we are able to model such dynamics with greater ease we can begin to incorporate them into models focusing
on the evolution of higher level social patterns, emergent patterns that would stand above basic cognitive
mechanisms in a larger dynamical hierarchy.
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